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Turkish Cypriot identity after 1974:  
Turkish Cypriots, Turks of Cyprus or Cypriots? 
 
 
Ioannis Moutsis 
 
 
Abstract 
The hopes created by the unexpected triumph of Mustafa Akıncı in the Turkish 
Cypriot parliamentary elections in 2015 opened once again the debate about Turkish 
Cypriot identity. Despite the various works on the issue since the opening of the 
borders in 2003, the issue of identity in the Turkish Cypriot community still remains 
under-researched. The hope of the Turkish Cypriots for reunification and an end to 
political isolation was replaced by skepticism after the rejection of the 2004 Annan 
Plan by the Greek Cypriots in a national referendum. Nevertheless the election of 
Mustafa Akιncı with an overwhelming sixty percent proves that the Turkish Cypriots 
should not be considered as loyal to the AKP-controlled Turkish political order as 
perhaps they were once thought to be. This article will attempt to examine the various 
aspects of Turkish Cypriot identity, as this has been formed by the Cyprus issue, their 
fifty-year-long isolation and the hope for an end of the present status quo that will 
open a window to the outside world forty-one years after the 1974 war and eleven 
years after the Annan Plan referenda. 
 
 
Until recently Greek Cypriot historiography and to a certain extent international 
historiography too often neglected the Turkish Cypriot community when dealing 
with the history and politics of Cyprus. This was especially true in the case of Greek 
Cypriot scholars, who, when referring to Cyprus, usually meant the Greek Cypriot 
community. Since the opening of the borders in 2003 and the Annan Plan 
referenda in 2004, the Turkish Cypriot community have attracted the interest of 
academics and journalists in an attempt to explain and analyse the structure of the 
community that has lived in Cyprus for centuries but has not been researched in 
detail due to political and ideological reasons.1 While Greek Cypriot scholars are 
expected to write extensively about their own community, international scholars 
also ignored the Turkish Cypriots for reasons that include their marginalisation 
until the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 and the relatively small 
size of the community.  In order to better understand the evolution of communal 
identity, this paper will look at the transition from the Ottoman era to the British 
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colonial period. Furthermore, the paper will look at the relations between Turkish 
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in order to demonstrate how elements of Turkish 
Cypriot identity evolved in relation to, and as a reaction to, the Greek Cypriot 
aspiration for enosis with Greece.2   
 
The Ottoman legacy and the British Colonial administration 
 
After the Ottoman–Venetian war of 1570-1573 that ended with the Ottoman 
conquest of Cyprus in 1571 and the a peace treaty of 1573 that made Cyprus an 
Ottoman province, until 1878, when Cyprus was ceded to Britain, the Turkish 
Cypriots were the millet-i hakime, the dominant element.3 It is estimated that 
about 8000 families from Anatolia were settled in Cyprus and were given fiefs 
(Gazioğlu 78). There are no references to mass Islamisation although some Greek 
Cypriots converted to Islam for tax purposes. Following the pattern of the millet 
system as it was implemented in other Ottoman provinces, the Orthodox church 
was granted significant autonomy and the archbishop of Cyprus was recognized as 
the millet başı, the head of the Christian Orthodox population of the island. The 
administration and the army were reserved for the Turkish Cypriots but many 
Turkish Cypriots were farmers and craftsmen. The Greek Cypriot elite were 
engaged in trade although wealthy Greek Cypriots were also landowners. The 
relations between the two communities were mostly positive throughout the three 
hundred years of Ottoman rule, but there were occasional uprisings recorded, 
mainly due to financial issues such as heavy taxation.4 When the Greek revolution 
erupted in the Balkans, the Greek Cypriots revolted too but the rebellion was 
suppressed by the Ottoman forces. 
During the Ottoman rule the wealth of the Turkish Cypriot community was 
safeguarded through the evkâf system, the Muslim religious endowments that 
controlled the agricultural lands and immovable property and funded communal 
institutions such as hospitals, poor-houses, schools, mosques and baths.5  The 
Turkish Cypriots amounted to between twenty and forty percent of the total 
population of the island throughout this period, but the Ottoman presence secured 
the privileges of the Turkish Cypriot population. As far as bicommunal relations 
were concerned, Turkish Cypriots coexisted with Greek Cypriots and in many cases, 
due to the greater number of Greek Cypriots, Greek was the lingua franca. 
Intermarriages were limited and, after the establishment of the Greek kingdom, the 
spread of Greek nationalism led to the gradual alienation of the two communities. 
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It should be stated that Turkish nationalism in Cyprus emerged later, as it did in 
other Ottoman provinces, due to the dominant position of Muslims in the Empire. 
 
The advent of British rule in 1878 altered the balance of power against the 
Turkish Cypriots. Although the British administration was neutral and did not 
favour any of the two communities, the end of the Ottoman presence meant that 
the Turkish Cypriots had to compete with the Greek Cypriots for administrative 
positions and positions of power. With the end of Ottoman rule, though, the 
Turkish Cypriots found themselves in a disadvantageous position for two reasons: 
firstly, the Greek Cypriots constituted the majority of the population and secondly 
the Turkish Cypriots lacked the resources and leadership that would enable them to 
respond to Greek Cypriot demands for autonomy. Soon after the launch of British 
rule, the Turkish Cypriots were obliged to defend their position and privileges in 
what they considered to be a hostile environment. The British introduced a system 
of political representation, the Legislative Council. It was presided over by the 
British governor of the island and comprised twelve elected and six appointed 
members. Nine of the elected members were “non Mohammedan” and three were 
“Mohammedan.” The three Turkish Cypriot members voted almost always with the 
six appointed members hence blocking all Greek Cypriot proposals. To avoid a 
stalemate the governor's vote was necessary. In this way, the legislative council 
divided Greek and Turkish Cypriot elites from the early stages of British rule. 
As far as the relations between Turkish Cypriots and the colonial government 
were concerned, the decision of the British to bring Muslim religious endowments 
under state control caused resentment in the Turkish Cypriot community because it 
curtailed the autonomy of the community, but more importantly because it was 
considered a direct intervention in their communal affairs. Controversial though 
this was, the British policy was tolerated by Turkish Cypriots because the 
preservation of good relations with the government was of utmost importance in 
the community’s struggle to answer Greek Cypriot demands for enosis. The 
decision to side with the colonial government was a consequence of another factor 
that also played an important role in the late emergence of Turkish nationalism on 
the island: the lack of a dynamic, entrepreneurial elite that could lead the Turkish 
Cypriots and respond to Greek Cypriot demands.   
The gradual collapse of the Ottoman Empire caused concern for the Turkish 
Cypriots, especially as Anatolia endured multiple military occupations after the end 
of the First World War. During the inter-war period various Turkish Cypriots 
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voiced their concern about the community’s lack of progress in trade and 
education, outlining the community’s need for modernisation in order to compete 
with the Greek Cypriot community (An, 79). The transition from an Ottoman-
Muslim identity to an ethnic, secular Turkish identity in the 1920s was accelerated 
by the fear of the Greek Cypriot plans for enosis. After the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey in 1923, the notion of Turkishness, as this was envisioned by 
the Kemalist regime, became popular among Turkish Cypriots and Turkish 
national identity was consolidated. The rise of Greek and Turkish nationalism on 
the island hindered the development of Cypriotness, a joint Cypriot identity, as 
both Greek and Turkish Cypriot students were educated in schools that were ran 
according to the curricula of the Greek and Turkish ministry of education. 6 
Towards the end of the 1920s, though, the rise of Turkish nationalism caused a 
short but fierce debate in the Turkish Cypriot elite. The new, pro-Kemalist elite 
questioned the predominance of the old guard, the İngilizci, or pro- English as they 
were called, due to their affiliation with the colonial government. The policy of the 
old elite to side with the colonial government in order to safeguard Turkish Cypriot 
rights against Greek Cypriot demands was questioned by the Kemalists, who 
claimed that government intervention did not necessarily respect Turkish Cypriot 
interests. For Turkish Cypriots, Kemal Atatürk represented the hope of a brighter 
future after decades of the Ottoman state’s disintegration. Despite the fact that 
Cyprus was not included in misak-i milli, the national pact that determined which 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire were to be included in the future Turkish state, 
the Turkish Cypriots saw in Kemal Atatürk a leader who would unite all Turks and 
support them in their struggle for survival. This explains the rapid and smooth 
implementation of Kemalist reforms in Cyprus. Unlike other Turkish communities 
that remained outside the borders of the Turkish state, opponents of the Kemalist 
regime did not settle in Cyprus and hence their influence on Turkish Cypriots was 
limited.   
It is worth mentioning that from the beginning of British rule, and especially 
after Cyprus was declared a crown colony in 1925, the Turkish Cypriot elite, 
regardless of political affiliation, rejected the minority status of their community 
and demanded to be treated as a distinct community instead. The disadvantageous 
position of the community vis-à-vis the wealthier and more politically active Greek 
Cypriots was discussed extensively in the Turkish Cypriot press of the time.7 For 
example, in an article published in the weekly Ankebut (Spider) under the title 
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“Sloth in commerce is the reason for the collapse,” the author expressed his worries 
in the following words:  
 
After it has been determined that the Turkish Cypriot community lives in poverty 
because of not engaging with trade, and that poverty causes political casualties, the 
Turkish youth stays away from enterprising, understanding that after a short period 
they are not going to be successful, so they show laziness and they abandon their jobs 
(my translation).8  
 
Similar worries were expressed regarding education. When in 1920 it became 
known that a Greek Cypriot middle school was going to open in Famagusta, the 
chief editor of Dοğru Yol (True Path) expressed his concerns about the condition of 
Turkish education: “Against the interest that our Christian fellow citizens show in 
education, the insufficiency and the miserable conditions of our schools is a sign of 
our ignorance.”9 
After the end of the Second World War, the further radicalisation of Greek 
Cypriot nationalism provoked a reaction from Turkish Cypriots. Towards the end of 
the 1940s, the first Turkish Cypriot party, KATAK (Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlık 
Kurumu, The Turkish Minority Association of the Island of Cyprus) was formed, 
led by Fazıl Küçük, a young doctor who later became vice president in the first 
government of an independent Cyprus. When Greek Cypriot EOKA (Εθνική 
Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, The National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) 
started a guerilla war against the British in 1955, the Turkish Cypriots formed TMT 
(Τürk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, Turkish Resistance Organisation). The Turkish 
Cypriots regarded the enosis movement as a threat to their existence on the island. 
The memory of those Turks who had to flee Crete after it was incorporated into 
Greece in 1913 was alarming for the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey responded to enosis 
with the political ideology of taksim  (partition). Since the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey, no Turkish government had laid any claims in regard to the 
future of the island. The Turkish government of Adnan Menderes orchestrated a 
pogrom against the Greek minority of Istanbul as a means of pressure against the 
Greek government on the Cyprus issue. The prospect of Cyprus coming under 
Greek control awoke the Sèvres syndrome in Turkey.10  The EOKA struggle was not 
directed against Turkish Cypriots, at least in its early stages. Therefore, we cannot 
be sure about the popularity of the idea of partition among the Turkish Cypriots. As 
Greek and Turkish nationalisms dominated the public agenda, the voices that 
called for a peaceful settlement were neglected and that led to the escalation of 
violence. From 1958 onwards the five major Cypriot cities obtained separate 
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municipal councils in order for the Turkish Cypriot communities to safeguard their 
autonomy. The London-Zurich agreements that established the Republic of Cyprus 
in 1960 were the product of a long and difficult process of negotiation between the 
British, Greek and Turkish governments, yet even before the island gained its 
independence the Greek Cypriots complained that Turkish Cypriot representation 
in the Republic of Cyprus was disproportionately high given that, as a minority of 
eighteen percent of the population, they controlled thirty percent of the state 
apparatus and forty percent of the police force. From the Turkish Cypriot 
perspective these provisions were necessary in order to safeguard the rights of the 
community against the Greek Cypriot majority’s aspirations to unite the island with 
Greece. 
The reluctant acceptance by both communities of a solution neither had fought 
for nor desired undermined the fate of the young state. The intercommunal 
violence during the EOKA struggle created mutual suspicion. Some Greek Cypriots, 
on the one hand, resented the privileges granted to the Turkish Cypriots by the 
constitution and did not embrace independence. Instead, they considered the 1960 
agreements a betrayal of the enosis ideal and the Turkish Cypriots an obstacle to 
the realisation of this goal. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, considered 
these privileges their only defence. The republic was also considered by many 
Turkish Cypriots a compromise, given the campaign for partition of the island. 
When intercommunal violence erupted again in 1963-1964, as the president of 
Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, proceeded to a unilateral amendment of the 
constitution in order to curtail Turkish Cypriot autonomy, the Turkish Cypriots 
withdraw from the administration. To protect themselves from the attacks of EOKA 
B, a Greek Cypriot guerilla group that aimed to dismantle the republic and unite 
the island with Greece, many Turkish Cypriots left their houses and settled in 
enclaves across the island that were under the armed protection of TMT. During 
this period, many Turkish Cypriots lived a life of fear and deprivation. The years 
from the eruption of violence in 1963-1964 until Turkish military intervention in 
1974 occupy a central point in the Turkish Cypriot collective memory. It is 
described as a time of suffering, martyrdom and a lack of support from the 
international community and even Turkey itself, with all of these contributing to a 
feeling of abandonment and isolation. At the same time, a common Turkish Cypriot 
identity was constructed and consolidated during this period of life in the enclaves 
as many Turkish Cypriots from different areas and backgrounds were thrown 
together. Under these circumstances, pro-solution voices were silenced and the 
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often violent suppression of opposition to TMT was tolerated. At the same time, 
Greek Cypriot intransigence, fueled by the fact that they now controlled almost the 
whole island, exacerbated Turkish Cypriot isolation. 
The Turkish military intervention on the 20 July 1974, five days after the 
unsuccessful attempt of the Greek military regime to overthrow President 
Makarios, is a decisive point in Cypriot history. For the Turkish Cypriots, the 
Turkish military intervention was popularly thought of as a long overdue peace 
operation that saved them from Greek Cypriot aggression and ended a decade of 
hardship and isolation. The segregation of the two communities in ethnically 
homogeneous areas was considered the only solution that would put an end to 
violence and provide for the Turkish Cypriots both self-determination and the 
safety of which they had been deprived for more than ten years. In this framework, 
there was no space for understanding the suffering of Greek Cypriots. Within a few 
months of the Turkish intervention about 65000 Turkish Cypriots were moved to 
northern Cyprus, which had been cleansed of its Greek Cypriot population.   
 
1974 and afterwards: Coping with new realities 
 
The Turkish military intervention provided a “homeland” in the north of Cyprus for 
Turkish Cypriots. In the following years almost all the Turkish Cypriots who had 
remained in Greek Cypriot-controlled territory were transferred to the north. There 
was a widespread feeling of relief as it was hoped that Turkish Cypriots would now 
be able to live in safety, in an area that was ethnically cleansed of Greek Cypriots 
and under the protection of the Turkish army. In the years leading up to 1974, 
many Turkish Cypriots had fallen victims to guerilla attacks by EOKA B and during 
the war there were many acts of retaliation by Greek Cypriots. Nevertheless, fleeing 
their houses to safety in the north was not easy for Turkish Cypriots. The 
provisional Turkish Cypriot administration settled the refugees in properties 
formerly occupied by Greek Cypriots. The trauma created by war and adaptation to 
a new life, away from their houses and the life they had lived in the south, was 
expressed, in certain cases, by burning blankets and breaking windows in houses 
left by Greek Cypriots and allocated to refugees (Volkan, 1979). It was an act of 
catharsis by the refugees, as they were trying, on the one hand, to cope with the 
guilt they felt for occupying the houses of Greek Cypriot refugees, and, on the other 
hand, to cleanse the houses of the presence of previous owners. 
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On the political front, the Turkish Cypriot Federated State was founded in 1975 
and emphasised the will of the community to seek a solution that would secure 
their territorial and administrative autonomy. As the negotiations failed to produce 
a solution, the Turkish Cypriot political elite, under the leadership of Rauf Denktaş, 
founded the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, which was, and 
still is, only recognised by Turkey. The international isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriot state had two major consequences: first, the self-proclaimed TRNC became 
entirely dependent on Turkey; and second, Turkish Cypriot public life came under 
the influence of Turkish nationalism. The continuation of the status quo was 
deemed preferable by the Turkish Cypriot leadership as it was hoped that, with the 
course of time, their independence would be recognised. At the same time, the 
migration of many Turkish Cypriots, mainly to Turkey and Britain, and the arrival 
of settlers from Anatolia, altered the demographic character of the fledgling 
Turkish Cypriot state. For the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the decrease of the 
Turkish Cypriot population was not problematic since the official view was there 
was no difference between mainland Turks and Cypriot Turks. This was eloquently 
expressed by president Rauf Denktaş’ words: “gelen Türk, giden Türk” – “those 
who leave are Turks, those who come are Turks” (Kizilyurek, 80). 
As a result of the 1974 war, Turkish Cypriots acquired a long-expected political 
sovereignty but came under the strict guidance of Turkey and the presence of a 
significant Turkish military force. The arrival of settlers, often from rural Anatolian 
villages, provided a cheap labour force but altered the demography and the 
sociopolitical landscape in northern Cyprus. While negotiations with the Greek 
Cypriots failed to deliver a solution, the memories of intercommunal violence and 
the political and financial dependence on Turkey created a paradoxical reality for 
the Turkish Cypriots: Turkey was seen as the liberator but its decisions often 
disregarded the will of the liberated Turkish Cypriots (Özkaleli, 41). Under these 
circumstances, Turkish nationalism became a focal point in Turkish Cypriot 
society. This relationship with Turkey, however, had an ambivalent influence on 
Turkish Cypriot identity. During the process of the Turkification of public life, 
many Turkish Cypriots felt the need to emphasise their own identity. 
Promoting Turkish Cypriot identity was not an easy task given both the 
predominance of Turkish nationalists and a concomitant distrust of Greek Cypriot 
intentions. As mentioned earlier, the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not want a 
solution and, with the help of an equally nationalist and maximalist Greek Cypriot 
leadership, led the negotiations to a dead end. This, together with the intimidation 
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and persecution of leftist and pro-Cypriot Turkish Cypriots,  was a significant 
reason for the domination of Rauf Denktaş in Turkish Cypriot politics. Supported 
by the centre-right UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi, National Unity Party), Denktaş was 
elected president of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State in 1976 and 1981 and then 
president of the TRNC in 1985, then reelected in three consecutive elections. In 
total, Denktaş remained in office for 30 years, from 1976 until 2005. In 2005 
Denktaş, at 81, did not run for president. Instead, the UBP  supported the 
candidacy of Derviş Eroğlu, head of the party and prime minister in Denktaş’s 
governments. Eroğlu, however, was defeated by Mehmet Ali Talat, who was 
supported by the centre-left CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, Republican Turkish 
Party). For the first time in the history of the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriots elected a 
centre-left president. The electorate’s shift from centre-right to centre-left can be 
traced to the discontent with economic conditions and the  events of 2003 and 
2004, namely  the opening of the borders that separated the Republic of Cyprus 
and the TRNC in April 2003 and the referenda on the Annan Plan that took place 
in both parts of the island in 2004. 
 
The opening of the borders and the Annan plan referenda: 
Coping with new realities 
 
From the end of 2002 and in early 2003, as negotiations for Cyprus’s accession to 
the EU were well under way and president Denktaş was undermining negotiations 
for a solution, Turkish Cypriots took to the streets, protesting against the Denktaş 
government and demanding a more flexible stance in negotiations that would bring 
the prospect of a solution closer. Such demonstrations were not common in Cyprus, 
north or south. Given the autocratic nature of the Denktaş regime in particular in 
northern Cyprus, as well as the tight control over local politics exercised by the 
Turkish government, the sight of Turkish Cypriots questioning the government and 
its intransigent policy on the Cyprus issue was, for many, unexpected. How, then, 
can we explain this attempt of a significant part of Turkish Cypriot society to defy 
the status quo? The 1974 war ended a period of suffering for the Turkish Cypriots 
and secured the self-rule of the community, at the expense of both Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. Due to the lack of a solution, the Turkish Cypriots found 
themselves isolated from the international community and governed by a political 
elite that had very good relations with successive Turkish governments. Although 
isolation was blamed on the Greek Cypriots, the social and financial realities for the 
Turkish Cypriots were still dire. Corruption and financial stagnation coupled with 
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cronyism caused discontent, but all internal issues were set aside due to the 
predominance of the national issue. When, in 2002, the solution to the Cyprus 
issue was connected to the accession of a united Republic of Cyprus to the EU, 
there was hope that the long period of isolation would come to an end. At the same 
time, the consequences of the financial crisis that had hit Turkey in 1999 were felt 
in Northern Cyprus too. The demonstrators hoped that a solution to the Cyprus 
problem would provide them with better financial conditions. As was to be 
expected, President Denktaş adopted a negative stance. Contrary to the Greek 
Cypriots, who since 1974 enjoyed relative prosperity and were thus less enthusiastic 
for a solution, the Turkish Cypriots were eager to embrace a solution that would 
offer them an end to isolation and years of underdevelopment. In the 2002-2003 
demonstrations, the notion of Cypriotness gradually became popular, especially 
among young Turkish Cypriots.  In the demonstrations, the Turkish Cypriots sent a 
message to the political elite that they were tired of decades of political stalemate, 
oppression–especially of leftist and liberal voices–and corruption. It was also a 
clear message to Turkey to allow the island’s accession to the EU as a united federal 
state. 
The demonstrations by Turkish Cypriots and the determination of EU leaders to 
admit the Republic of Cyprus to the EU led the government of the TRNC to open 
the border that separates the Republic of Cyprus from the TRNC, a border which 
had remained closed since 1974. Consequent communication between the two 
communities helped towards the establishment of a positive atmosphere, and, in 
these circumstances, Turkish Cypriots voted en masse in favour of the Annan Plan 
for reunification in simultaneous referenda organised on both sides of the border in 
2004. The plan was turned down by Greek Cypriot voters but the opening of the 
borders and the prospect of a solution paved the way for the election of Mehmet Ali 
Talat to the presidency of the TRNC in 2005. The stalemate in the negotiations 
between Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot president Dimitris Christofias, and 
the disappointment among Turkish Cypriots, was expressed in the election of 
centre-right candidate Derviş Eroğlu in the 2010 presidential elections. 
Nevertheless, since 2002 there has been greater popular resistance to Turkey's 
influence, even though the TRNC is still funded by Turkey. Conditions in Northern 
Cyprus have improved since 2003 but the policy of the EU towards the Greek 
Cypriots caused disappointment amongst Turkish Cypriots, who were expecting the 
Republic of Cyprus’s EU membership to have the added effect of ending their 
international isolation. In addition, economic growth in Turkey was reflected in 
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Northern Cyprus too, a factor in Eroğlu’s election. Five years later, the 2015 
election of Mustafa Akıncı, head of the TKP (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi, 
Communal Liberation Party) and ex-mayor of the Turkish municipality of Nicosia, 
demonstrated the Turkish Cypriot will for a solution despite an apprehensive 
political discourse in Greek Cypriot society and hesitation by the then Turkish 
government. 
Notwithstanding the forty-year-long separation of the two communities, a 
common trend can be observed in Cyprus. Greek and Turkish nationalisms are now 
competing with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism. As far as the Greek 
Cypriots are concerned, this process began after the 1974 war, a consequence of 
Greek intervention in the coup d’état against President Makarios. Hence, Greek 
nationalism has evolved into a Greek Cypriot nationalism that emphasises control 
of the Republic of Cyprus by Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots, alternatively, 
have responded to the tight control of successive Turkish governments and their 
attempts to turkify the population in northern Cyprus with the evolution of a 
Turkish Cypriot nationalism that emphasises the Cypriot character of Turkish 
Cypriots while resisting, at the same time, the process of Turkification. This is 
evident in the Turkish Cypriot approach to Islam. Due to a history of coexistence 
with a Christian majority, Turkish Cypriot Islam has traditionally been 
latitudinarian and hence less fanatical than in mainland Turkey. Thus, contrary to 
what has been happening in Turkey in the last ten years, religion has not become 
pivotal in public life despite the attempts of Turkey’s governing AKP and its 
followers in Cyprus  to build more mosques and introduce religious secondary 
education schools (İmam Hatip okulları) (Moudouros, 2013). The resistance of the 
Turkish Cypriot population to the tight control of the Turkish state is also evident 
in recent election results, where it is estimated that Turkish settlers, who are 
expected to be more conservative than Turkish Cypriots, also voted in favour of 
pro-solution Akıncı. Finally, it should be noted that the issue of Turkish Cypriot 
identity is also demonstrated in the term used by the administration and in the 
press. The left prefers the term Kıbrıslı Türkler (Turkish Cypriots) while the right 
prefers to use to term Kıbrıs Türkü (Turks of Cyprus) (Erhürman, 2011). The first 
term emphasises the Cypriot origin of the Turkish Cypriots while the second puts 
more emphasis on a Turkish origin. Similar to the trend among Greek Cypriots to 
identify with the idea of Cypriotness, a common Cypriot identity is being 
increasingly discussed by Turkish Cypriots too. Although the emergence of 
Cypriotness has been pivotal in the rhetoric of the Left, both Turkish and Greek 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 06:46:25 |
Ioannis Moutsis, Turkish Cypriot identity after 1974  
 
 
 
 
Synthesis 10 (Fall 2017)                                                                                                                       127 
 
Cypriot, as well as the successful implementation of any future federal solution, 
Turkish and Greek nationalisms are still strong on the island and the political 
powers have not embraced the need for a common Cypriot identity. Of course, the 
decades of separation mean that time, alongside the genuine effort of the political 
elites of both communities, is required to develop the idea of Cypriotness. There is 
also the ongoing danger of a Turkish Cypriot nationalism that excludes Greek 
Cypriots, just as a persistent Greek Cypriot nationalism that excludes Turkish 
Cypriots has evolved in the last decades.11 
 
Turkish Cypriots, Turks or Turks of Cyprus 
 
Turkish Cypriot identity has been shaped by the Ottoman presence in Cyprus and 
the political events that have taken place in the last hundred and forty years, 
beginning with the end of the Ottoman era and arrival of the British in 1878 and 
the launch of the Greek Cypriot campaign for enosis. As a response to the rise of 
Greek nationalism on the island, Turkish nationalism evolved too. The lack of an 
entrepreneurial Turkish Cypriot elite delayed the emancipation of the community 
that remained attached to the British colonial government in order to secure their 
rights and privileges. The experience of other Ottoman populations that were 
obliged to immigrate to Anatolia as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated deeply 
affected the Turkish Cypriots and mobilised them to secure their position on the 
island. The need for good relations with the British colonial government should 
therefore be evaluated as an attempt to safeguard the community's position on the 
island against the threat of enosis.  The emergence of Turkish nationalism on the 
island took longer than the emergence of Greek nationalism, but by the mid-
twentieth century it can be argued that a significant part of the Turkish Cypriot 
population were ready to actively stand against any attempt by the Greek Cypriots 
to unite the island with Greece. Under these circumstances, Turkish Cypriots 
rejected their status as a minority community and fought for the recognition of 
their communal rights. The 1963-1964 intercommunal violence provided the 
excuse for the withdrawal from the Republic of Cyprus and the preparations for 
establishing a separate state. Although the decision to abandon their villages and 
gather in enclaves supported by the TMT was largely imposed by hard-liners 
among Turkish Cypriot leaders, it was often deemed the only solution that could 
secure Turkish Cypriot security. The trauma caused by the 1963-1974 period 
consolidated the idea among Turkish Cypriots that the only solution was the 
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creation of a separate state where they could live in security. The 1974 Turkish 
intervention gave the Turkish Cypriots their own state in the north of Cyprus, but 
they did not achieve full sovereignty due to international isolation and the tight 
control of their self-proclaimed republic by Turkey. The status quo that was 
established in Cyprus after 1974 did offer Turkish Cypriots the long-awaited 
security and self-governance they desired, but the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus became, as a result of its unrecognised status in the international 
community, totally dependent on Turkey. The predominance of the Turkish army 
in Northern Cyprus, perceived as necessary for the security of the community, and 
the political and financial dependence on Turkey, caused frustration for many 
Turkish Cypriots. Despite the arrival of many settlers from Anatolia, a distinct 
Turkish Cypriot identity persisted, something which can be seen in the will of the 
Turkish Cypriot community to reach a solution that will end their dependence on 
Turkey and their isolation. Without denouncing their Turkish identity, the Turkish 
Cypriots have struggled to preserve their Cypriotness. After years of tight control 
from Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots continue to demonstrate their wish for a 
solution by bringing to power on more than one occasion presidents who believe in 
reunification. 
 
 
 
                                                             
1  Some of the most distinguished publications on the history of the Turkish Cypriot 
community in the early twentieth century include Altay Nevzat's Nationalism Amongst the 
Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave and Εlena Bouleti's The English Policy Towards the 
Turkish Cypriot Community 1878-1950. 
 
2 Enosis or union with Greece was the Greek Cypriot facet of the Megali Idea, the aspiration 
of Greek nationalists to unite the Greek-speaking populations of the Balkans and Anatolia 
under Greek rule. It was first expressed in the mid-nineteenth century and the result of the 
Greco-Turkish war in Anatolia in 1922 signified its end. Despite the unwillingness of Greek 
governments to support the enosis movement after 1922, the Greek Cypriot elite continued 
the campaign that in 1955 was escalated with the beginning of the EOKA guerilla war against 
the British. 
 
3 The Ottoman administration divided the Empire’s population according to their faith. This 
was the millet system, from the plural of the Arabic word millah, that means nation. It 
provided for a Christian, a Jewish, an Armenian and later a Catholic millet. These 
communities were administered according to their own canonical laws. The Muslims of the 
Empire were members of the millet-i hakime, the dominant element. 
 
4 Members of both communities participated in some of the revolts. For example, both Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots took part in the 1764 revolt against Cil Osman, the new governor of 
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Cyprus who was murdered by a mob. The reasons behind this unrest can be attributed to 
socio-economic issues. The 1821 revolt, though, was a spill-over of the uprising in mainland 
Greece against the Ottomans. Greek Cypriots, led by the clergy, revolted against the Ottoman 
authorities in Cyprus, but the uprising was suppressed and the archbishop, together with 
other members of the clergy, were hanged. For more information on the coexistence of the 
two communities under the Ottomans see Dietzel.  
 
5 Evkâf, the plural of the Arabic word wakf, is the movable and immovable property that is 
used for religious purposes in Muslim communities. In Cyprus, from the beginning of 
Ottoman rule, the wealth of the Turkish Cypriot community was administered by the evkâf. 
After the British took over the administration of the island, the government attempted to 
take control of the evkâf by appointing a British and a Turkish Cypriot delegate who, in 
essence, were state officials. 
 
6 Cypriotness (Kıbrıslılık in Turkish, Κυπριωτισμός in Greek) is a term used to describe a 
common Cypriot identity. It came on the agenda gradually after 1974 in an attempt to forge 
loyalty to the Cypriot state surpassing Greek and Turkish nationalisms. It emphasized the 
experience of peaceful coexistence between the two communities before the war. The idea of 
a common Cypriot identity was pivotal in the discussions that preceded the Annan Plan 
referenda in 2004. 
 
7 The first Turkish Cypriot newspapers began their publication a few years after the arrival of 
the British. Until the end of the Second World War, most newspapers were short lived. In the 
1920s, the press was actively engaged in the campaign for the implementation of the 
Kemalist reforms. The nationalist elite was supported by Söz (Statement) while the pro-
British elite voiced their opinion through Hakikat (Truth). 
 
8 Ankebut, 2 April 1921 quoted in An, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun 32. 
 
9 Doğru Yol, 10 October 1920, quoted in An, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunu 9.For more information 
on the Turkish Cypriot press on the conditions of the Turkish Cypriot community in the 
1920s see Moutsis. 
 
10 The Sèvres Syndrome is a popular belief in Turkey that a plot exists to weaken and 
undermine the integrity of the Turkish state. It is based on the legacy of the treaty of Sèvres 
in the 1920s that provided for the occupation of various provinces of Anatolia by British, 
French, Italian and Greek forces, leaving only a small part of central Anatolia for the Turks. 
Although the treaty of Sèvres was annulled in 1923 in the aftermath of the Turkish War of 
Independence and replaced with the treaty of Lausanne, Turkish foreign policy, in its more 
paranoiac moments, still bears the mark of the Sèvres syndrome. 
 
11 On the Greek Cypriot nationalism see Mavratsa. 
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